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INTRODUCTION 
Roughly 95% of felony convictions are obtained through guilty pleas 
rather than trials.1  Despite the integral role of plea bargains in our criminal 
justice system, however, the Supreme Court has declined to create a 
separate standard for determining whether a defendant’s Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel2 has been violated in the guilty plea context.  Instead, the 
two-prong test for determining whether counsel was ineffective at trial, 
developed in Strickland v. Washington,3 governs.4  In Strickland, the 
Supreme Court held that a defendant’s right to effective counsel is not 
violated as long as counsel’s performance does not fall “below an objective 
standard of reasonableness”5 and prejudice the defendant by affecting the 
outcome of the proceeding.6 
Surprisingly, in Hill v. Lockhart, the Court decided that the Strickland 
test was likely to function properly in the guilty plea context.7  The Court 
concluded this despite concerns both that guilty pleas are less likely to be 
fully investigated than trials, and that counsel’s responsibilities in the plea 
context involve more unreviewable “off the record” activities such as 
advising the accused and negotiating with the prosecution than it does on 
“on the record” reviewable actions.  Nonetheless, the Court extended the 
Strickland test to the guilty plea context in Hill with one slight alteration: 
the first prong of Strickland remains the same, but the second prong 
requires that a defendant allege that but for his attorney’s deficient 
performance, he would have gone to trial rather than plead guilty.8  This 
Comment focuses on this second “prejudice” prong of the Strickland–Hill 
test. 
Determining the effect of counsel’s performance based on the outcome 
of a trial is difficult and subjective.  The challenge is amplified in the plea 
setting.  Guilty pleas produce thin records and leave little support for a 
defendant’s claim of prejudice.  Additionally, courts tend to rely heavily on 
 
1  In 2006, 94% of felony convictions in state courts were obtained through guilty pleas.  See Bureau 
of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Table 5.46.2006, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
STATISTICS ONLINE, http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t5462006.pdf (last visited Oct. 30, 2011).  
In 2008, 97% of felony convictions in federal district courts were obtained through guilty pleas.  See 
Admin. Office, U.S. Courts, Table 5.24.2008, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS ONLINE, 
http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t5242008.pdf (last visited Oct. 30, 2011). 
2  U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have 
the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”). 
3  466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
4  See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58–59 (1985) (adopting the two-prong Strickland test to 
determine whether counsel is ineffective in the guilty plea context). 
5  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. 
6  Id. at 694 (“The defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”). 
7  474 U.S. at 58–59. 
8  Id. at 59. 
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rote assurances from the defendant at the time a plea is entered, stating that 
the plea is voluntary, and stating that she was not promised anything that 
was not disclosed to the court in exchange for her plea.9  These assurances 
provide a method of “reversal proofing” guilty pleas; the underlying 
purpose of establishing this record is to ensure that the defendant’s plea is 
voluntary and entered with knowledge of its consequences. 
In its mandatory adoption of the Strickland–Hill standard, Illinois has 
tipped the scales even further in the direction of reversal-proofing pleas by 
requiring a defendant to do one of two things to satisfy the prejudice prong 
of the Strickland test: (1) raise a claim of innocence, or (2) raise a defense 
that he could have raised at trial.10  The purpose of this requirement is to 
demonstrate that, absent counsel’s deficient performance, the defendant 
would have gone to trial and had a high probability of being acquitted.  
Rather than focusing on the factors that influenced the defendant’s decision 
to enter a plea, the Illinois standard centers on the predicted outcome of a 
hypothetical trial. 
This standard creates an almost insurmountable hurdle for a defendant 
who receives ineffective assistance when pleading guilty.  The Illinois 
standard sets such a high bar that it effectively guarantees a fundamentally 
fair process only to those defendants who are actually innocent.  This 
guarantee does not satisfy the Sixth Amendment and fails to meet the goals 
of the Strickland test.11 
While it would of course be permissible for Illinois courts to require 
more of defense counsel and provide greater protection to defendants than 
does Strickland,12 it is not permissible to deny defendants the full scope of 
protection guaranteed by Strickland and insulate deficient performance 
from review.  The Strickland–Hill version of the prejudice prong requires a 
defendant to show that she would have gone to trial but for counsel’s 
deficient performance.13  Because the Illinois prejudice prong effectively 
 
9  See Preliminary Proceedings: Guilty Pleas, 38 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 403, 412–13 
(2009).  A plea that is negotiated by the prosecution and defense, whether partially or fully negotiated, is 
not binding on the trial court; the trial court still must agree to the sentence.  Id. at 407.  A defendant 
may withdraw her plea if the trial court rejects the negotiated agreement.  Id. at 409.  However, when 
there is not a negotiated agreement between the parties and a blind plea is entered, a defendant is not 
entitled to withdraw her plea if the court does not follow a recommended sentence or sentencing range.  
Id. at 408. 
10  See People v. Rissley, 795 N.E.2d 174, 205 (Ill. 2003). 
11  See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.  The Court noted that the Sixth Amendment was designed 
“simply to ensure that criminal defendants receive a fair trial.”  To this end, the Strickland test was 
designed to allow a court to make a fair assessment of counsel’s conduct by evaluating the challenged 
conduct, from counsel’s perspective, at the time it occurred.  See id. 
12  See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Five Views of Federalism: “Converse-1983” in Context, 47 VAND. 
L. REV. 1229, 1244 (1994) (“[T]he federal Constitution . . . establishes a minimum baseline—a floor—
that state judges must respect upon penalty of reversal.  But the floor need not become a ceiling.”). 
13  Hill, 474 U.S. at 59. 
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requires innocence, therefore lowering the “floor” set by Strickland, it is 
unconstitutional. 
At a minimum, Illinois needs to realign with the standard established 
by Strickland–Hill.  Alternatively, a new standard for determining whether 
a defendant has been denied effective assistance when pleading guilty 
should be adopted.  An appropriate standard could take a number of forms, 
and should align the defendant’s burden of proof with the Strickland-Hill 
test.  Alternatives developed for application in the plea context will 
encourage counsel to provide defendants with effective assistance while 
maintaining the finality of properly entered guilty pleas. 
Part I of this Comment examines the relationship between guilty pleas 
and ineffective assistance of counsel.  It discusses the prevalence of guilty 
pleas in both state and federal courts and explains the relationship between 
the requirement that a plea be entered knowingly and voluntarily and the 
standards for ineffective assistance.  Part II focuses on the development of 
the Strickland standard and its extension to guilty pleas in Hill.  Part III 
examines the adoption of the Strickland–Hill standard in Illinois and traces 
the origins of the additional requirements that the Illinois Supreme Court 
has incorporated into the prejudice prong.  It argues that Illinois should 
align its interpretation of the Strickland–Hill prejudice prong more closely 
with the underlying goals of fundamental fairness and accuracy identified in 
Strickland and Hill.  Finally, Part IV alternatively suggests that even if the 
approach adopted in Illinois is constitutional, the Supreme Court should 
adopt a standard that is more administrable in the guilty plea context to 
replace the Strickland–Hill test. 
I. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE AND GUILTY 
PLEAS 
Because an overwhelming percentage of defendants resolve their cases 
through guilty pleas, representation by counsel in the guilty plea process 
likely constitutes the most important service a lawyer provides for his 
client.14 
Section A explains that the vast majority of felony convictions are 
obtained through guilty pleas.  Section B dispels the misconception that all 
defendants who plead guilty do so because they are actually guilty and are 
certain to be convicted at trial.  Finally, Section C discusses the 
 
14  Defendants are entitled to counsel in plea proceedings because the process is considered to be 
adversarial in nature.  See Trials: Right to Counsel, 38 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 491, 491 
(2009).  The Constitution requires the government to ensure that proceedings which may deprive an 
accused of his freedom are conducted fairly.  See JAMES J. TOMKOVICZ, THE RIGHT TO THE ASSISTANCE 
OF COUNSEL: A REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 155–56 (2002) (“Lawyers 
ensure that the adversarial system functions as a true ‘confrontation between adversaries.’  They 
promote the interests of the defendant and subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful ‘adversarial 
testing.’” (quoting United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 656–57 (1984))). 
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interrelatedness of guilty pleas and ineffective assistance of counsel by 
explaining that pleas are required to be both “voluntarily” and 
“intelligently” entered and that ineffective assistance of counsel may render 
a defendant’s plea involuntary. 
A. Prevalence of Guilty Pleas 
Nearly 95% of convictions are obtained through guilty pleas.15  In 
Illinois, the percentage of convictions achieved through guilty pleas is 
slightly below the national average—roughly 86% in the state overall and 
70% in Cook County.16  The prevalence of the use of guilty pleas is not a 
recent trend, and actually predates the establishment of the ineffective 
assistance of counsel standard.17  The Supreme Court has acknowledged 
both the prevalence of guilty pleas and that “[s]tate[s] to some degree 
encourage[] pleas of guilty at every important step in the criminal 
process.”18 
B. Misconceptions Surrounding Guilty Pleas 
One might assume that few innocent defendants plead guilty.  
However, anecdotal evidence suggests that some portion of innocent 
defendants who are accused of a crime plead guilty despite their 
innocence.19  Put more frankly, “once a person is facing felony charges, the 
issue no longer is whether he did the crime; it’s how to limit the damage.”20  
A former prosecutor explained, “A wise defendant, with the help of his 
lawyer, thinks pragmatically . . . .  Sometimes trials bring surprises—
 
15  See Bureau of Justice Statistics, supra note 1. 
16  In 2006, 51,766 convictions on felony charges occurred through guilty pleas in the circuit courts 
of Illinois, 9694 convictions were reached through bench trials, and another 715 were convicted by 
juries.  ADMIN. OFFICE, ILL. COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS COURTS: STATISTICAL 
SUMMARY 59 (2006), available at http://www.state.il.us/court/SupremeCourt/AnnualReport/2006/Stat/
2006%20Statistical%20Summary.pdf.  In Cook County, which encompasses the city of Chicago and 
surrounding suburbs, 19,343 convictions occurred through guilty pleas, 9094 were reached through 
bench trials, and 280 were convicted by juries.  Id. 
17  See DONALD J. NEWMAN, CONVICTION: THE DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE 
WITHOUT TRIAL 3 (Frank J. Remington ed., 1966) (“[T]he trial is not the most common method of 
convicting or acquitting defendants.  Roughly 90 per cent of all criminal convictions are by pleas of 
guilty . . . .”). 
18  Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 750 (1970). 
19  See, e.g., SAMUEL R. GROSS ET AL., EXONERATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES: 1989 THROUGH 
2003 12 (2004), available at http://www.soros.org/initiatives/usprograms/focus/justice/articles_
publications/publications/exonerations_20040419/exon_report.pdf (noting that nineteen of 329 
exonerees in the study’s database pled guilty to avoid the risk of life imprisonment or the death penalty). 
20  STEVE BOGIRA, COURTROOM 302: A YEAR BEHIND THE SCENES IN AN AMERICAN CRIMINAL 
COURTHOUSE 334 (2005) (quoting statements made during an interview with Kevin Bolger, a criminal 
defense attorney and former prosecutor practicing at Chicago’s Cook County Criminal Courthouse). 
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surprises that turn the flimsiest cases into convictions . . . .  So you get the 
best deal you can and you get out of there.”21 
The reasons that defendants enter guilty pleas are varied.  In many 
cases, a plea provides advantages to both the defendant and the prosecution.  
The defendant may limit or reduce her sentence while starting the 
correctional process immediately.22  The prosecution may conserve scarce 
resources and avoid the risk that the state could not sustain its burden of 
proof at trial.23 
There is no way to determine what proportion of guilty pleas is entered 
by defendants who are not guilty.  “It is well known . . . that many 
defendants who can’t afford bail plead guilty in return for short sentences, 
often probation and credit for time served, rather than stay in jail for months 
and then go to trial and risk much more severe punishment if convicted.”24  
According to one study, defendants who initially pleaded guilty and were 
later exonerated make up only about 6% of exonerees.25  However, the 
existence of such cases suggests that pleading guilty does not always 
reliably signify actual guilt.  Additionally, because pleading guilty can 
make innocence more difficult to establish at an eventual trial than it would 
otherwise have been, the proportion of exonerees in this category may be 
artificially low.26 
C. Requirement that Pleas Are Entered into “Voluntarily and Intelligently” 
When entering a guilty plea,27 a defendant must stand in open court and 
enter an admission that she committed the charged acts for which she is 
pleading guilty.28  Because these actions require the defendant to waive his 
 
21  Id. (internal quotation mark omitted). 
22  Brady, 397 U.S. at 751–52; see also NEWMAN, supra note 17, at 96 (“The victim of a crime is 
often as reluctant to be exposed to the publicity and trauma of a trial as is the perpetrator.  The guilty 
plea is quick and relatively anonymous. . . .  The guilty plea, even if not preceded by a charge reduction, 
offers the sentencing judge both a rationalization for showing leniency to deserving defendants and an 
opportunity to do so in a setting ordinarily free from the publicity which attends trial.”). 
23  See NEWMAN, supra note 17, at 95. 
24  GROSS ET AL., supra note 19, at 12.  
25  See id. (noting that only 19 of the 328 individuals exonerated initially pleaded guilty, or roughly 
6% of all exonerations included in the database). 
26  See Scott W. Howe, The Value of Plea Bargaining, 58 OKLA. L. REV. 599, 631 n.170 (2005) 
(suggesting that guilty plea convictions may leave fewer avenues for later legal challenges to the 
conviction, and that public sentiment that innocent individuals rarely plead guilty may make accessing 
legal and investigatory assistance more difficult). 
27  See generally Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969) (“A plea of guilty is more than a 
confession which admits that the accused did various acts; it is itself a conviction; nothing remains but 
to give judgment and determine punishment.”). 
28  See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970).  With the court’s consent, a defendant may 
enter a plea of nolo contendere rather than plead guilty; however, courts treat such pleas as admissions 
to all charges in the indictment.  See Preliminary Proceedings: Guilty Pleas, supra note 9, at 403–04 & 
n.1294.  Therefore, the plea of nolo contendere has the same effect at sentencing as a guilty plea.  See, 
105:1707  (2011) Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
 1713
trial-related constitutional rights, including the right to be tried by a jury of 
his peers and the right to be confronted by the witnesses against him,29 a 
plea is not valid unless the defendant waives these protections knowingly.30  
Additionally, because the defendant has a Fifth Amendment right not to “be 
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself,”31 the plea 
must be entered into voluntarily and without threat of “physical harm” or 
“mental coercion” in order to be valid.32  Although the requirement that a 
plea be both voluntary and intelligent was already well-established, Boykin 
v. Alabama added the requirement that the record of the proceeding 
affirmatively disclose both items when the plea is entered.33  Reversal-
proofing pleas contributed to the Court’s interest in developing this record.34 
When a defendant challenges the voluntariness of a plea, a court must 
consider “all of the relevant circumstances surrounding [the plea],”35 
including counsel’s representation.36  After pleading guilty based upon 
advice from counsel, a defendant may only attack the voluntary and 
intelligent nature of the plea by showing that the advice he received from 
counsel violated the standard set forth in Strickland–Hill.37  A guilty plea 
 
e.g., Gomez v. Berge, 434 F.3d 940, 942–43 (7th Cir. 2006); Preliminary Proceedings: Guilty Pleas, 
supra note 9, at 404 n.1294.  For purposes of this Comment, guilty pleas and nolo contendere will be 
referred to collectively as “guilty pleas.” 
29  U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a 
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been 
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the 
nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory 
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”); 
see also Brady, 397 U.S. at 748. 
30  See U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
31  Id. 
32  Brady, 397 U.S. at 750.  A guilty plea is not compelled, and therefore is valid, when it is 
motivated by a defendant’s interest in receiving a specific or lesser sentence rather than facing a wider 
range of possibilities at trial.  Id. at 751. 
33  395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969).  Further, the Illinois Supreme Court adopted a rule that requires trial 
judges to determine that a guilty plea is entered knowingly and voluntarily.  ILL. SUP. CT. R. 402(a)–(b).  
The judge must advise the defendant of the nature of the charges against him and the maximum and 
minimum sentences that he may be subject to under the law.  Id. at 401(a)(1)–(2).  The defendant also 
must be notified of his waiver of trial rights and the judge must determine, on the record, that the plea 
was not obtained by “force or threats or any promises, apart from a plea agreement.”  Id. at 402(b). 
34  Boykin, 395 U.S. at 244 n.7 (“If these convictions are to be insulated from attack, the trial court is 
best advised to conduct an on the record examination of the defendant which should include, inter alia, 
an attempt to satisfy itself that the defendant understands the nature of the charges, his right to a jury 
trial, the acts sufficient to constitute the offenses for which he is charged and the permissible range of 
sentences.” (quoting Commonwealth ex rel. West v. Rundle, 237 A.2d 196, 197–98 (Pa. 1968)) (internal 
quotation mark omitted)). 
35  Brady, 397 U.S. at 749. 
36  Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56 (1985). 
37  See id. at 57.  Prior to Strickland, the applicable ineffectiveness standard was governed by 
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970).  The McMann test asked whether a guilty plea was “a 
voluntary and intelligent act of the defendant.”  Id. at 772.  Strickland added an additional prejudice 
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entered by a well-informed and appropriately counseled defendant is not 
subject to postconviction attack because the applicable law changed or 
because hindsight indicates that the plea entered was not as “sensible” as it 
appeared to be at the time.38 
Courts rely heavily on the defendant’s affirmative statements to 
indicate that a plea was, in fact, voluntary.  However, these statements 
should not be viewed as conclusive, judgment-proof statements of a 
defendant’s understanding of what she is giving up by pleading guilty.  
“The plea bargain is the typical last act of the courthouse drama.  Judges 
engage defendants in monotone and sometimes mumbled plea colloquies.  
Defendants bark ‘yes’ and ‘no,’ as required, and are instructed to consult 
with their lawyers should they forget what line goes where.”39  Defendants 
may fear that the consequences of not playing their role will negatively 
impact the sentence that is ultimately assigned by the judge.40 
If the court determines that a plea was not voluntary because the 
defendant received ineffective assistance from counsel, the applicable 
remedy depends upon when counsel’s errors occurred and when the 
defendant raised his ineffective assistance claim.41  If performance was 
ineffective only during the sentencing phase, the court may require a new 
penalty phase without vacating the conviction or ordering an entirely new 
trial.42  In many cases, the ineffective assistance claim is made in a 
postconviction or habeas corpus petition,43 where the immediate remedy 
 
requirement to the McMann test.  For a discussion of the development of the Strickland test, see infra 
Part II.A. 
38  See Brady, 397 U.S. at 756–57 (“Often the decision to plead guilty is heavily influenced by the 
defendant’s appraisal of the prosecution’s case against him and by the apparent likelihood of securing 
leniency should a guilty plea be offered and accepted.  Considerations like these frequently present 
imponderable questions for which there are no certain answers; judgments may be made that in the light 
of later events seem improvident, although they were perfectly sensible at the time.”). 
39  Josh Bowers, Response, The Unusual Man in the Usual Place, 157 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 
260, 274 (2009), http://www.pennumbra.com/responses/05-2009/Bowers.pdf. 
40  See id. 
41  See, e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 675, 686–87 (1984) (considering only whether 
the defendant’s sentence should be overturned and not whether the conviction should be vacated when 
the defendant claimed he received ineffective assistance of counsel during a capital sentencing 
proceeding). 
42  Id. 
43  Typically, claims of ineffective assistance are limited to collateral review and are not considered 
on direct appeal.  See Trials: Right to Counsel, supra note 14, at 527–28.  Habeas review is permitted 
after a defendant has exhausted all state remedies, including state postconviction proceedings.  Id. at 
528. 
Claims of ineffective assistance may be related to professional qualifications; performance before 
trial, during jury selection, during trial, and during sentencing; performance on appeal; and actions 
related to jury instructions.  Id. at 521–25; see also Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 378 (1986) 
(“A layman will ordinarily be unable to recognize counsel’s errors and to evaluate counsel’s 
professional performance . . .[and] consequently a criminal defendant will rarely know that he has not 
been represented competently until after trial or appeal, usually when he consults another lawyer about 
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sought may simply be an evidentiary hearing.44  After the hearing, the 
reviewing court may vacate the defendant’s plea if it determines that the 
petitioner’s claim has merit.45 
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARD FOR INEFFECTIVENESS OF COUNSEL 
This Part discusses the development of the two-prong Strickland test 
for analyzing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.  Section A lays out 
the Strickland test, which establishes the floor on a defendant’s Sixth 
Amendment right to effective counsel in the trial setting.  Section B 
discusses the Supreme Court’s application of the Strickland test to guilty 
pleas in Hill. 
A. Ineffective Assistance in the Trial Context 
In McMann v. Richardson, the Supreme Court recognized that the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel is the right to “effective counsel.”46  The 
Court did not establish, however, what qualified representation as effective.  
Nor did the Court directly address a claim of actual ineffectiveness of 
counsel until Strickland, fourteen years later.47 
In Strickland, the Court established a two-prong test to determine when 
counsel’s performance qualifies as ineffective, and as a result, is a violation 
of a defendant’s right to counsel.48  Although the proceeding at issue in 
 
his case.  Indeed, an accused will often not realize that he has a meritorious ineffectiveness claim until 
he begins collateral review proceedings . . . .”(citation omitted)). 
44  See, e.g., People v. Hall, 841 N.E.2d 913, 924 (Ill. 2005) (determining that the defendant was 
entitled to an evidentiary hearing because he made a substantial showing that he received ineffective 
assistance of counsel). 
45  See, e.g., id. at 924 (“Following the evidentiary hearing, defendant might be allowed to withdraw 
his guilty plea . . . .”).  Defendant Hall, who pleaded guilty to one count of aggravated kidnapping, filed 
a postconviction petition claiming, among other issues, that his counsel was ineffective in 
recommending that he enter a guilty plea.  Id. at 916–17.  The postconviction petition was dismissed 
prior to an evidentiary hearing.  Id. at 917.  Upon finding that the defendant established both prongs of 
an ineffective assistance claim, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the defendant was entitled to an 
evidentiary hearing on his postconviction claim that his plea was involuntary.  Id. at 924. 
46  397 U.S. 759, 770–771 & 771 n.14 (1970) (stating that “the right to counsel is the right to the 
effective assistance of counsel,” and that effective counsel consists of a “reasonably competent attorney” 
whose advice is “within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases”).  Gideon v. 
Wainwright established the modern right to counsel and applied the Sixth Amendment to the states 
through the Fourteenth Amendment.  372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (stating that the right to counsel is 
“fundamental” in nature and “essential to fair trials”). 
47  466 U.S. at 683.  Prior to Strickland, the Court considered Sixth Amendment claims based on 
actual or constructive denial of assistance of counsel and claims based on state interference with 
counsel’s ability to provide a defendant with effective assistance.  Id. 
48  Id. at 694. 
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Strickland was a capital sentencing hearing, the Court said that it was 
“sufficiently like a trial in its adversarial format” to be evaluated as such.49 
The Court’s determination that the purpose of the Sixth Amendment 
guarantee of counsel was to ensure that a defendant received a fair trial 
guided the development of the Strickland test.50  The Court defined a fair 
trial as one “whose result is reliable.”51  Carefully, the Court noted that the 
purpose of the Sixth Amendment is “not to improve the quality of legal 
representation” but is “simply to ensure that criminal defendants receive a 
fair trial.”52 
To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance and show that a 
conviction “resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders 
the result unreliable,” a defendant must satisfy both prongs of the Strickland 
test,53 though there are some circumstances under which prejudice may be 
assumed and need not be established by the defendant.54 
Under the first prong, the defendant must show that counsel’s 
performance was deficient by falling “below an objective standard of 
reasonableness.”55  The objective standard is to be based on “reasonableness 
 
49  Id. at 686.  In Strickland, the defendant pleaded guilty to three capital murders in addition to 
kidnapping charges in a Florida trial court.  Id. at 671–72.  Prior to pleading, the defendant confessed to 
two of the murders.  Id. at 672.  The defendant told his attorney that he did not have a significant 
criminal record and that he was under extreme emotional stress at the time of the murders, but the 
attorney decided not to present any mitigating evidence at the capital sentencing hearing.  Id. at 672–73.  
The trial judge found several aggravating circumstances and no significant mitigating factors.  Id. at 675.  
He sentenced the defendant to death on each count of murder and to prison terms for the other crimes.  
Id. 
Upon review, the attorney stated that his decision not to investigate the defendant’s background, 
obtain a psychiatric evaluation, or present character witnesses was strategic and intended to prevent the 
state from cross-examining the defendant or presenting its own psychiatric evidence.  Id. at 673.  After 
granting certiorari and defining the two-prong test for ineffective assistance, the Supreme Court held 
that the defendant failed to satisfy either prong of the test.  Id. at 700.  The Court stated that the 
sentencing proceeding was not “fundamentally unfair” and reversed the court of appeals, concluding that 
the district court properly denied habeas corpus.  Id. at 700–01. 
50  Id. at 686 (“In giving meaning to the requirement [of representation by counsel], however, we 
must take its purpose—to ensure a fair trial—as the guide.”). 
51  Id. at 687; see also TOMKOVICZ, supra note 14, at 167 (“The Strickland majority believed that the 
‘reasonable probability’ standard strikes just the right balance between the accused’s interests in 
effective assistance and a fair trial and the state’s interest in finality.  Under that standard, a 
constitutional violation is found when, but only when, the likelihood that a defendant did not enjoy the 
substantive protection guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment is too high to be ignored.”). 
52  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. 
53  Id. at 687; see also United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 657–62 (1984).  Generally, a court may 
dispose of an ineffectiveness claim by evaluating either the prejudice prong or performance prong first.  
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697. 
54  Prejudice is assumed if there was a: (1) complete denial of counsel during a critical stage of trial, 
(2) complete failure to subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing, (3) situation in 
which not even a fully competent attorney could provide effective assistance, or (4) situation in which 
counsel actively represented conflicting interests.  Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659, 661 & n.28. 
55  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. 
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under prevailing professional norms.”56  Additionally, because judicial 
scrutiny of counsel’s performance is intended to be “highly deferential,” the 
defendant must overcome a presumption that counsel’s conduct may have 
been a sound strategy decision when assessed from counsel’s perspective at 
the time of trial.57  For example, in Strickland, at the sentencing hearing, 
defendant’s counsel argued that extreme emotional distress was a mitigating 
circumstance and relied on the defendant’s acceptance of responsibility for 
his crimes rather than on alternative approaches.58  The Court found that 
counsel’s decisions were strategy choices “well within the range of 
professionally reasonable judgments.”59 
The second prong of Strickland requires the defendant to affirmatively 
show that he was prejudiced by counsel’s deficient performance.60  
Compared to the theoretically objective first prong, the second prong is 
more subjective and requires that a defendant convince the court “that there 
is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the 
result of the proceeding would have been different.”61  In determining 
whether prejudice exists, the court must consider the “totality of the 
evidence before the judge or jury.”62 
In Strickland, the Court described the relevant question as “whether 
there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the 
sentencer . . . would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and 
 
56  Id.  The Court found that “[m]ore specific guidelines [were] not appropriate” because the Sixth 
Amendment relies on the “legal profession’s maintenance of standards sufficient to justify the law’s 
presumption that counsel will fulfill the role in the adversary process that the Amendment envisions.”  
Id. 
57  Id. at 689. 
58  For a discussion of the sentencing hearing, see supra note 49. 
59  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 699. 
60  Id. at 693.  Prior to Strickland and Cronic, the Court had never required a convicted defendant to 
establish actual prejudice on the outcome of the proceeding at issue to make a Sixth Amendment claim.  
Vivian O. Berger, The Supreme Court and Defense Counsel: Old Roads, New Paths—A Dead End?, 
86 COLUM. L. REV. 9, 89 (1986). 
61  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; see also TOMKOVICZ, supra note 14, at 160 (“The defendant must 
demonstrate more than just ‘some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding’ but does not 
have to establish ‘that counsel’s deficient conduct more likely than not altered the outcome in the case’; 
that is, he does not have to show a probability of harm greater than 50 percent.  The requisite likelihood 
of adverse effect falls between these two levels.” (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693)). 
62  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695.  The Court suggested that whether or not a particular error is 
prejudicial depends in part on the relative strength of the record.  See id. at 695–96.  For example, in a 
case where the record strongly supports the verdict, a particular error may have a trivial effect, but in 
another case where the record only weakly supports the outcome of the proceedings, the same error 
could be prejudicial.  Id.  For examples of egregious conduct found to be non-prejudicial, see Jeffrey L. 
Kirchmeier, Drink, Drugs, and Drowsiness: The Constitutional Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel 
and the Strickland Prejudice Requirement, 75 NEB. L. REV. 425, 455–63 (1996) (describing cases where 
the Strickland test was not satisfied despite the fact that attorneys were intoxicated, sleeping, mentally 
ill, or abusing drugs while at trial). 
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mitigating circumstances did not warrant death.”63  Subsequently, the Court 
found that due to the overwhelming aggravating factors, no reasonable 
probability existed that the presence of the omitted mitigating evidence 
would have changed the sentence imposed on the defendant.64 
Not all of the Justices agreed with the development of the Strickland 
approach.  Justice Marshall disagreed with the majority on nearly every 
point of the Strickland decision.  He pointed out that the only justification 
given by the majority for the adoption of a highly deferential standard was 
that a more receptive standard would encourage too many defendants to file 
ineffective assistance claims.65  In relation to the first prong, he objected to 
the “malleable” nature of the test because it told the lower courts and 
defense attorneys “almost nothing” about what would constitute adequate 
representation.66 
Justice Marshall also opposed the prejudice requirement for two 
reasons.67  He disagreed with the majority’s interpretation of the Sixth 
Amendment, arguing that the Constitution requires “fundamentally fair 
procedures,” including a fair trial and counsel who “vigorously” advocates 
for the defendant’s interests.68  He did not believe that counsel’s 
performance was irrelevant in instances where the correct result was 
achieved at trial.69  Marshall suggested that due process is violated 
whenever a defendant does not receive meaningful assistance of counsel in 
an adversarial proceeding.70 
 
63  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695. 
64  Id. at 700. 
65  Id. at 713 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“I have more confidence than the majority in the ability of 
state and federal courts expeditiously to dispose of meritless arguments . . . .”); see also id. at 690 (“The 
availability of intrusive post-trial inquiry into attorney performance or of detailed guidelines for its 
evaluation would encourage the proliferation of ineffectiveness challenges.  Criminal trials resolved 
unfavorably to the defendant would increasingly come to be followed by a second trial, this one of 
counsel’s unsuccessful defense.”). 
66  Id. at 707–08 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 663 
(1984) (rejecting the Tenth Circuit’s use of five factors to provide a basis for determining whether the 
defendant was provided with competent counsel).  Over time, criticism of the looseness of the Strickland 
test has been somewhat abated as courts have increasingly “tightened” counsel’s duty to investigate by 
looking to American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice as “an evaluative tool rather than 
mere ‘guidelines’” to analyze defense counsel’s performance.  Robert R. Rigg, The T-Rex Without 
Teeth: Evolving Strickland v. Washington and The Test for Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 35 PEPP. 
L. REV 77, 104 (2007). 
67  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 710 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
68  Id. at 711. 
69  Id. (disagreeing with the majority and characterizing their viewpoint as standing for the principle 
“that the only purpose of the constitutional guarantee of effective assistance of counsel is to reduce the 
chance that innocent persons will be convicted” and that “the Sixth Amendment is not violated when a 
manifestly guilty defendant is convicted after a trial in which he was represented by a manifestly 
ineffective attorney”). 
70  Id. 
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Additionally, Justice Marshall thought it “senseless” to require a 
defendant whose lawyer was shown to be incompetent to carry the burden 
of demonstrating prejudice.71  He argued that “[t]he difficulties of 
estimating prejudice after the fact are exacerbated by the possibility that 
evidence of injury to the defendant may be missing from the record 
precisely because of the incompetence of defense counsel.”72  He suggested 
that the Strickland test should instead focus on whether counsel departed 
from “constitutionally prescribed standards” rather than requiring 
prejudice.73  In such cases, defendants would be entitled to a new trial 
regardless of whether they “suffered demonstrable prejudice.”74 
B. Extension of the Strickland Test to Guilty Pleas 
About eighteen months after Strickland, the Supreme Court extended 
the two-prong approach to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in the 
guilty plea context.75  Prior to Hill, McMann provided the rule regarding the 
voluntariness, and therefore the validity, of a guilty plea.  That decision 
required that attorney performance fall “within the range of competence 
demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.”76  As in Strickland, the first prong 
of the test remained materially the same and required that a convicted 
defendant show that her attorney’s performance “fell below an objective 
standard of reasonableness.”77  The Court reasoned that sentencing hearings 
 
71  Id. at 710. 
72  Id.; see also Berger, supra note 60, at 92 (“After-the-fact reconstruction of events and decisional 
processes is not easy; it usually requires supplementing the trial transcript at a post-trial hearing or in 
habeas proceedings.”). 
73  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 712 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
74  Id. 
75  Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57 (1985) (“Although our decision in Strickland v. Washington 
dealt with a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in a capital sentencing proceeding . . . our 
justifications for imposing the ‘prejudice’ requirement . . . are also relevant in the context of guilty 
pleas . . . .”). 
In Hill, the defendant pleaded guilty to charges of first-degree murder and theft of property after his 
attorney negotiated a guilty plea.  Id. at 53–54.  Under the plea agreement, the state agreed to 
recommend concurrent sentences of thirty-five years for the murder and ten years for the theft.  Id. at 54.  
Later, the defendant alleged that his guilty plea was involuntary because his attorney provided 
ineffective assistance of counsel by misinforming him of when he would be eligible for parole.  Id. at 
54–55.  Because the defendant had a prior conviction, he was not eligible for parole until he served half 
of his sentence, rather than the one-third that his attorney advised him of prior to entering his plea.  Id. 
In his petition for habeas corpus, the defendant did not allege that he would have gone to trial had his 
attorney correctly advised him of the collateral consequences of his plea.  Id. at 60.  Additionally, the 
defendant did not supply any “special circumstances that might support the conclusion that he placed 
particular emphasis on his parole eligibility in deciding whether or not to plead guilty.”  Id.  The Court 
affirmed the lower court’s dismissal of his habeas petition without a hearing.  Id. 
76  See McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970). 
77  See Hill, 474 U.S. at 57 (citing McMann, 397 U.S. at 687–88) (internal quotation mark omitted); 
see also Gabriel J. Chin & Richard W. Holmes, Jr., Effective Assistance of Counsel and the 
Consequences of Guilty Pleas, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 697, 733 (2002) (“The Hill v. Lockhart decision, 
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or trials were similar enough to the plea process to apply the same 
standard.78 
The Court also extended the application of the prejudice prong to the 
context of guilty pleas, determining that it served “the fundamental interest 
in the finality of guilty pleas.”79  The McMann prejudice requirement is 
slightly different from its Strickland counterpart: it focuses on whether 
“counsel’s constitutionally ineffective performance affected the outcome of 
the plea process.”80  To satisfy the requirement, “the defendant must show 
that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would 
not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.”81  The 
Court suggested that in many cases, this analysis would look nearly 
identical to the Strickland analysis and would hinge on whether counsel 
would have still recommended the plea.82  In Hill, the Court held that the 
defendant failed to allege the type of prejudice necessary to satisfy the 
Strickland test because he did not allege that “he would have pleaded not 
guilty and insisted on going to trial.”83 
Although Justice White and Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment, 
their agreement relied on a factual point: the defendant did not establish that 
his attorney knew of his prior criminal record before determining when the 
defendant would become eligible for parole.84  The distinction between the 
majority opinion and Justice White’s concurrence, joined by Justice 
Stevens, turned on whether the defendant expected a particular sentence 
based on his counsel’s estimate or whether his counsel’s advice was a 
 
however, contains no suggestion that counsel’s duty is less in the context of a plea.  Earlier Supreme 
Court decisions recognize that a defendant’s decision to plead guilty is based on at least some of the 
same kind of evaluation and investigation that is necessary to go to trial.” (footnote omitted)). 
78  Hill, 474 U.S. at 58. 
79  Id.; see also United States v. Timmreck, 441 U.S. 780, 784 (1979) (detailing this principle more 
thoroughly and stating that “[e]very inroad on the concept of finality undermines confidence in the 
integrity of our procedures; and, by increasing the volume of judicial work, inevitably delays and 
impairs the orderly administration of justice.  The impact is greatest when new grounds for setting aside 
guilty pleas are approved because the vast majority of criminal convictions result from such pleas” 
(quoting United States v. Smith, 440 F.2d 521, 528–29 (7th Cir. 1971) (Stevens, J., dissenting)) (internal 
quotation mark omitted)). 
80  Hill, 474 U.S. at 59. 
81  Id. 
82  Id.  The Court pointed out that this analysis requires a court to predict how the outcome of the 
proceeding might have changed if a trial was held.  Id.  As in Strickland, evaluations of the outcome of 
this hypothetical trial are to be as objective as possible.  Id. at 59–60. 
83  Id. at 60; see also TOMKOVICZ, supra note 14, at 169 (“A defendant must demonstrate a 
cognizable likelihood that he would have chosen to stand trial but apparently does not have to establish a 
reasonable probability that the result of the trial would have been different from the result of the guilty 
plea.”).  See infra Part IV.B for further discussion of this interpretation. 
84  Hill, 474 U.S. at 61–62 (Stevens & White, JJ., concurring).  The plea statement, signed by the 
defendant, stated that he did not have any prior convictions; however, the defendant had one prior 
conviction.  Id. at 61. 
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misstatement of the law.85  The majority viewed counsel’s advice as an 
estimate because the negotiated plea agreement did not bind the trial court, 
which had the freedom to sentence the defendant to another term if it saw 
fit.86  Further, determinative parole eligibility was not included in the plea 
agreement.87  The extension of the Strickland test to the plea setting creates 
new challenges for defendants who must now satisfy the Strickland 
prejudice requirements to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel. 
III. DEVELOPMENT OF THE ILLINOIS STANDARD FOR INEFFECTIVENESS OF 
COUNSEL 
This Part examines Illinois’s adoption and development of the 
Strickland–Hill88 standard in the guilty plea context.  Section A focuses on 
the origin of additional requirements incorporated into the Strickland–Hill 
standard that are applied in Illinois.  Section B details the Illinois standard 
for ineffective assistance in the guilty plea context, which requires a 
defendant to claim either innocence or a plausible defense that could be 
raised at trial to satisfy the prejudice prong. 
A. Development of the “Additional Pieces” of the Illinois Standard 
Although Illinois courts adopted the standard for ineffective assistance 
in the guilty plea context from Hill, they have also incorporated several 
additional requirements that stem from the appellate courts.  The first 
additional piece is from the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Key v. United 
States,89 in which the court evaluated a post-Hill claim of ineffective 
 
85  Id. at 62 (“The failure of an attorney to inform his client of the relevant law . . . cannot be said to 
fall within ‘the wide range of professionally competent assistance’ demanded by the Sixth Amendment.” 
(quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690 (1984)). 
86  Id. at 60 (“In the present case the claimed error of counsel is erroneous advice as to eligibility for 
parole under the sentence agreed to in the plea bargain.”). 
87  See Steve Clark & Alice Ann Byrns, Hill v. Lockhart: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: The 
State’s Position, 23 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 83, 91 (1985) (“[A]dvice should not be held as rendering a plea 
involuntary where the state court record presumptively establishes that the advice was not part of the 
plea bargain and did not induce the plea.  Likewise important, the recommended sentence was not 
binding on the trial court; thus, the issue of parole eligibility amounts to no more than a sentence 
estimate by counsel on which the defendant based his erroneous expectation and hope for leniency.  The 
State is aware of no precedent which indicates that all terms and conditions discussed in the plea 
bargaining process, whether between defense counsel and his or her client or even with the state’s 
attorney, can be held to have induced a plea of guilty.” (footnotes omitted)). 
88  The ineffective assistance of counsel test applied in the guilty plea context is often referred to as 
the Strickland test, the Hill test, or by some combination of both names.  For the purposes of this 
Comment, Strickland–Hill will be used to refer to the test that was initially developed in Strickland and 
was later adjusted and extended to guilty pleas in Hill.  For a discussion of the development of this test, 
see supra Part II. 
89  806 F.2d 133 (7th Cir. 1986). 
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assistance of counsel.90  In Key, the convicted defendant attempted to meet 
the prejudice prong required by Strickland–Hill by stating that but for his 
attorney’s erroneous promise that “he would ‘be on the street in twelve 
months,’” he would have gone to trial.91  At trial, he contended, a jury 
would have been unable to convict him for “want of a corpus delecti 
[sic].”92 
In evaluating the prejudice prong, the court expressed concern over 
what a defendant must show to establish his claim.93  The Seventh Circuit 
determined “that merely making bare allegations of alleged promises is 
insufficient to show actual prejudice” and that a defendant must supply the 
court with facts which indicate “the result of the proceeding would have 
been different.”94  “[M]erely alleg[ing] a promise by counsel,” as the 
prisoner had in his habeas petition, failed to satisfy the standard laid out by 
the court.95  The court suggested that evidence such as the terms of the 
promise made by counsel, when and where the promise was made, and the 
identities of any witnesses to the promise, which would allow the court to 
“meaningfully assess” the defendant’s claim, would be sufficient to satisfy 
the defendant’s evidentiary burden.96 
Building on the requirements articulated in Key, the Seventh Circuit 
clarified that a defendant’s claim that he would not have entered into a 
particular plea agreement or sentence if he had been better advised by 
counsel does not satisfy the prejudice requirement without more.97  It held 
that prejudice is not established when a defendant “only suggests that he 
 
90  See id. at 138.  Key, along with six other defendants, was indicted on eleven tax-related charges.  
Id. at 135.  Partway through trial, Key agreed to enter a guilty plea pursuant to a negotiated plea 
agreement.  Id.  He was sentenced to three years in prison and ordered to pay a $15,000 fine.  Id.  
Although he did not file a direct appeal, Key later filed a habeas petition claiming ineffective assistance 
of counsel, among other collateral attacks on the guilty plea proceeding.  Id.  The court affirmed the 
lower court’s dismissal of Key’s habeas petition without an evidentiary hearing.  Id. at 140. 
91  Id. at 138 n.5 (quoting Pet’r’s Br.). 
92  Id. (internal quotation mark omitted).  Corpus delicti is defined as “the body of the offense” or 
“the substance of the crime” and is often used to describe visible evidence of a crime.  BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 395 (9th ed. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
93  Key, 806 F.2d at 138–39 (discussing decisions reached in other appellate courts regarding the 
“prejudice prong,” including the First Circuit, Fifth Circuit, Ninth Circuit, and Eleventh Circuit). 
94  Id. at 139. 
95  Id. 
96  Id.  The court cautioned that even these specific facts may not be enough to overcome the record 
and warrant an evidentiary hearing.  Id. 
97  Gargano v. United States, 852 F.2d 886, 891 (7th Cir. 1988) (holding that although “the petitioner 
admitted in a memorandum that a plea-bargain would be the most likely outcome were the case to return 
to the active docket,” prejudice was not established).  In Gargano, the defendant was under indictment 
for ten charges related to cocaine distribution and weapons possession.  Id. at 887.  He pleaded guilty 
and was sentenced to a term of fourteen years in prison pursuant to a negotiated agreement.  Id.  The 
Seventh Circuit affirmed the lower court’s dismissal of defendant’s habeas petition, which was based on 
a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.  Id. at 891.  Defendant alleged that counsel was ineffective 
for misstating the consequences of conviction under enhanced sentencing laws.  Id. at 889. 
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should have had the opportunity to strike a harder bargain with the 
government”;98 the prejudice prong requires that the defendant would have 
gone to trial—not simply struck a harder bargain—but for counsel’s 
deficient performance.99 
After Key added to the threshold evidentiary requirements necessary to 
satisfy the prejudice prong of Strickland–Hill as applied in Illinois and the 
rest of the Seventh Circuit, the First Circuit contributed a new requirement 
later adopted by Illinois courts.  In United States v. LaBonte,100 the First 
Circuit heard a consolidated appeal primarily related to the interpretation of 
a career offender sentencing statute but which also included a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel.101  The defendant alleged that his plea was 
entered after his trial attorney “assured him that his sentence would be no 
more than eighteen months, and that there was simply ‘no way’ that he 
would be sentenced as a career offender.”102  He was sentenced to a 262-
month term of imprisonment.103 
When applying the Strickland–Hill prejudice prong to the defendant’s 
claim of ineffective assistance, the court stated that “[e]ven a generous 
reading of this claim leaves no doubt that [the defendant] failed adequately 
to allege any cognizable prejudice.”104  The court characterized counsel’s 
statements to the defendant as an “inaccurate prediction,” and thus, 
“standing alone, [do] not satisfy the prejudice prong of the ineffective 
assistance test.”105  Most importantly, the court implied that the defendant 
needed to raise “either a claim of innocence” or articulate “any plausible 
defense that he could have raised had he opted for trial” to meet his burden 
of proof on the second prong of Strickland–Hill.106  Because the defendant 
could not establish that he suffered prejudice as a result of his attorney’s 
performance, the court elected not to evaluate that performance under the 
first prong.107 
 
98  Id. at 891. 
99  See id. 
100  70 F.3d 1396 (1st Cir. 1995), overruled on other grounds by 520 U.S. 751 (1997). 
101  Id. at 1400, 1412–13.  In LaBonte, one of the defendants, Stephen Dyer, pleaded guilty to a 
charge of conspiring to possess controlled substances with intent to distribute.  Id. at 1403. 
102  Id. at 1413. 
103  Id. at 1403. 
104  Id. at 1413. 
105  Id. 
106  Id. 
107  Id. at 1414.  Interestingly, the LaBonte court adopted this standard from dicta in a D.C. Circuit 
Court case, United States v. Horne, 987 F.2d 833 (D.C. Cir. 1993).  See 70 F.3d at 1413.  In Horne, the 
court discussed the difficulty in determining what the prejudice prong of the Strickland–Hill test 
required of defendants.  987 F.2d at 835–36.  The court elected to leave the question of “how much more 
[than a bare allegation] is required of [the defendant]” unanswered because the defendant who raised the 
ineffectiveness claim did not allege that he would have insisted on going to trial but for counsel’s errors, 
and therefore altogether failed to address the prejudice prong of the test.  Id. at 836 (“Nothing in the 
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B. The Illinois Standard for Ineffective Assistance in the Context of Guilty 
Pleas 
Illinois has adopted the Strickland–Hill test for determining whether a 
defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel when she entered a plea 
of guilty.108  In addition to the traditional Strickland–Hill requirements, a 
defendant must satisfy additional requirements that the Illinois Supreme 
Court adopted from the appellate courts and incorporated into its 
interpretation of Strickland–Hill109 to succeed on her claim. 
In People v. Rissley,110 the Illinois Supreme Court discussed the 
difficulty of determining the probability that a defendant would have gone 
to trial.  The court adopted the Key threshold that a bare statement is not 
enough to establish prejudice.111  The court then adopted the LaBonte 
requirement that a defendant must raise a claim of innocence or a plausible 
defense that could have been raised at trial in order to satisfy the prejudice 
prong.112  In evaluating the defendant’s claim that the “mistaken advice” he 
received from counsel constituted ineffective assistance,113 the court first 
acknowledged that the defendant’s attorney lacked experience in capital 
cases.114  Second, the court noted that the attorney’s co-counsel and 
consulting death penalty expert thought that recommending the entry of a 
blind plea in a death-penalty-eligible case was ill-advised.115  Finally, the 
court recognized that that counsel admitted he that he did not know or, at a 
 
present record suggests that Horne had (or even now has) any intention of pleading not guilty and going 
to trial.”). 
108  Illinois first adopted the Strickland standard in People v. Albanese and then applied it to an 
ineffective assistance claim in the guilty plea context in People v. Huante.  See People v. Huante, 571 
N.E.2d 736, 739 (Ill. 1991); People v. Albanese, 473 N.E.2d 1246, 1255–56 (Ill. 1984). 
109  See supra Part II.A. 
110  795 N.E.2d 174 (Ill. 2003).  In Rissley, the defendant entered a blind plea to charges of 
aggravated kidnapping and murder.  Id. at 177.  The plea was entered “without negotiation and without 
defense counsel’s conducting an extensive investigation of potential mitigation.”  Id. at 188.  At his 
capital sentencing hearing, he was sentenced to death on the murder charge and fifteen years in prison 
on the aggravated kidnapping charge.  Id. at 188, 207.  The defendant raised several claims of 
ineffective assistance among some fifty-six other claims in his postconviction petition.  Id. at 178. 
The defendant alleged that his attorney, along with his co-counsel and a death penalty expert 
retained in the case, recommended he enter blind pleas to both charges because it would prevent him 
from getting the death penalty.  Id. at 195.  Finally, the defendant alleged that his attorney did not inform 
him that his case could be heard by a judge in a bench trial rather than a jury.  Id.  Note that while the 
defendant raised multiple ineffective assistance claims, only the most pertinent claim is discussed here. 
111  Id. at 204.  For a more detailed discussion of Key, see supra Part III.A. 
112  Rissley, 795 N.E.2d at 205.  For a more detailed discussion of LaBonte, see supra Part III.A. 
113  Rissley, 795 N.E.2d at 203. 
114  Id. at 196.  In fact, co-counsel on the case immediately prepared and filed a motion to withdraw 
defendant’s plea and believed that the counsel’s sworn affidavit and the death penalty expert’s testimony 
would be enough to withdraw the plea.  Id. at 196–97.   
115  Id. at 197 (“[T]he death penalty expert] advised [counsel] that the guilty plea was ill-advised 
because by pleading guilty defendant had nothing left to bargain with . . . .”). 
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minimum, did not discuss the possibility of a bench trial for the case-in-
chief.116  Primarily based on counsel’s failure to realize that the defendant 
could proceed with a bench trial, the court “assume[d]” that counsel was 
deficient for purposes of the appeal.117 
In turning to the second prong of the Strickland–Hill test, the court 
focused on the fact that the defendant “[did] not now allege that he [was] 
innocent, nor [did] he claim to have any plausible defense that he could 
have raised had he chosen a bench trial.”118  The court relied on defendant’s 
admissions during the plea proceedings to draw these conclusions.119  
Despite counsel’s deficient performance, the court concluded that the 
defendant entered his plea to “gain leniency from the sentencing jury” and 
that the court’s “confidence in the outcome [was] not ‘undermined.’”120  
Because the defendant failed to make anything more than a bare allegation, 
the Rissley court did not have to determine when the prejudice prong would 
be satisfied.  It nevertheless adopted the innocence or defense requirement 
from LaBonte.121 
IV. THE ILLINOIS APPLICATION OF THE PREJUDICE PRONG OF STRICKLAND–
HILL IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
The Illinois application of the Strickland–Hill prejudice prong is 
unconstitutional because it only addresses the effectiveness of counsel 
provided to a defendant in the guilty plea context if that defendant can raise 
a claim of innocence or a defense to the charges against him.  In this Part, 
section A examines the difficult threshold and heightened subjectivity of 
this standard.  Then, section B considers whether the Supreme Court has 
communicated that actual innocence is not part of the ineffectiveness 
calculation. 
A. A Steep and Subjective Barrier 
The Supreme Court left it to the states and appellate courts to 
determine what would be sufficient to satisfy the subjective prejudice 
 
116  Id. at 198 (“No, I didn’t think of it, I didn’t discuss it, I didn’t discuss it.” (internal quotation 
mark omitted)). 
117  Id. at 204. 
118  Id. at 205.  It appears that the defendant simply entered a “bare allegation” that was described by 
the court as “subjective, self-serving, and . . . insufficient to satisfy the Strickland requirement for 
prejudice.”  Id. (quoting Turner v. Tennessee, 858 F.2d 1201, 1206 (6th Cir. 1988) (internal quotation 
marks omitted), vacated on other grounds, 492 U.S. 902). 
119  Id.  For a discussion of the admissions that a defendant is required to make on the record in order 
to enter a guilty plea, see supra notes 27–28 and accompanying text. 
120  Rissley, 795 N.E.2d at 206.  The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the defendant’s conviction and 
sentence.  Id. at 207. 
121  Id. at 205. 
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requirement of the Strickland–Hill prejudice prong.122  Illinois has focused 
the prejudice prong on requiring that a defendant show that he could be 
found innocent or acquitted at trial.123  This standard has two fundamental 
flaws: first, this burden is nearly insurmountable for defendants in the guilty 
plea context.  Second, the right to counsel has never been conditioned upon 
guilt or innocence. 
The record in a plea hearing consists mostly of the defendant entering 
her plea,124 and leaves little else for a court to evaluate on appeal beyond 
any available affidavits from the defendant and counsel.125  This leaves 
defendants with little ammunition to meet a heavy burden of proof; in many 
cases, courts simply weigh the defendant’s accusations of ineffective 
assistance against his attorney’s rebuttal.126 
For example, when applying the Illinois prejudice standard in People v. 
Hall,127 the court considered the plea hearing transcript, a copy of the 
charging instrument, and the defendant’s affidavit in support of his claim 
that he was misadvised about the possibility of a defense to the charge of 
 
122  See, e.g., Key v. United States, 806 F.2d 133, 138 (7th Cir. 1986) (expressing concern over how 
to interpret the defendant’s burden under the prejudice prong); Rissley, 795 N.E.2d at 204 (“[I]t is by no 
means obvious how a court is to determine the probability that a defendant would have gone to trial.”). 
123  See the discussion of Rissley, supra Part III.B, where the court determined that the defendant did 
not achieve the requisite prejudice after the performance prong was satisfied because the court focused 
on the defendant’s lack of a credible claim of innocence or defense. 
124  See supra notes 33–34 and accompanying text (discussing admissions that are required to be on 
the record when a defendant’s plea is entered); see also Preliminary Proceedings: Guilty Pleas, supra 
note 9, at 414 (“[T]he court reporter must keep a verbatim record of the plea proceedings that take place 
in court, including the court’s advice to the defendant, the voluntariness inquiry, the factual basis 
inquiry, and the details of the plea agreement.”). 
125  See Richard Klein, The Relationship of the Court and Defense Counsel: The Impact on 
Competent Representation and Proposals for Reform, 29 B.C. L. REV. 531, 551–52 (1988) (“Given the 
sparseness of the record when a plea is taken, proving prejudice to courts that desire finality will be most 
difficult. . . .  It is, however, virtually impossible for a state appeals court, relying on the plea record, to 
evaluate ‘likely success.’” (footnote omitted)); see also Berger, supra note 60, at 110 (“As Judge 
Cudahy of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit correctly noted, assessing prejudice in terms of a 
putative outcome at trial is ‘unworkable . . . because the reviewing court has no trial record to review 
and consequently no way of evaluating the effect of counsel’s errors in relation to the case as actually 
presented by the prosecution.’” (quoting Evans v. Meyer, 742 F.2d 371, 380 (7th Cir. 1984) (Cudahy, J., 
dissenting))). 
126  Reviewing a sparse, “cold” record presents additional challenges for appellate courts that must 
distinguish opinion from promise, misstatement from misrepresentation, and strategy decision from 
neglect.  See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 710 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“On the 
basis of a cold record, it may be impossible for a reviewing court confidently to ascertain how the 
government’s evidence and arguments would have stood up against rebuttal and cross-examination by a 
shrewd, well-prepared lawyer.”). 
127  841 N.E.2d 913 (Ill. 2005).  The defendant filed a postconviction petition, seeking withdrawal of 
his guilty plea and claiming that the plea was involuntary because he received ineffective assistance of 
counsel.  Id. at 915.  The defendant entered a negotiated plea to aggravated kidnapping based on his 
attorney’s advice that he did not have a valid defense to the charges.  Id. at 916–17.  He received a 
recommended sentence of six years in prison.  Id. at 916. 
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aggravated kidnapping, inducing him to enter his plea.128  In Hall, the 
defendant was charged with aggravated kidnapping, theft of property, and 
aggravated and unlawful refusal of an order to stop after he stole a car that 
had an infant sleeping in a car seat inside of it.129  The court read the 
elements of aggravated kidnapping aloud at the time the plea was entered, 
which included knowledge of the child’s presence.130  The trial and 
appellate courts determined that because the defendant was informed that 
the prosecution would be required to establish the element of knowledge to 
convict him of aggravated kidnapping before the defendant entered his plea, 
erroneous advice provided by defendant’s trial counsel did not prejudice the 
defendant.131  As a result, the trial and appellate courts held the defendant’s 
claim of prejudice insufficient.132   
On review, the Illinois Supreme Court explained that “[t]hese 
allegations indicate counsel’s legal advice was rendered within the bounds 
of a private consultation between defendant and his attorney” and pointed 
out that the discussions surrounding a defendant’s decision whether to enter 
a guilty plea or go to trial “generally occur in private to protect the 
confidentiality of privileged information.”133  The information available to 
the court in this case was comparable to that which was available in 
Rissley.134 
Although the court in each case determined that the defendant 
established the first prong of the Strickland–Hill test,135 the results diverged 
during the prejudice prong analysis.  As discussed above, the Rissley court 
determined that the defendant did not make a sufficient showing that the 
result at trial would be different.136  In making this determination, the court 
 
128  Id. at 916–17.  The defendant alleged that he only intended to steal the car because he needed a 
ride home and that he repeatedly told his lawyer that he did not realize there was an infant sleeping in 
the car when he took it.  Id. at 917.  Despite the fact that “knowledge” is an element of aggravated 
kidnapping, id. at 918, the defendant’s lawyer “repeatedly informed defendant that his lack of awareness 
of the child was not a defense to the charge,” id. at 917. 
129  Id. at 916–17. 
130  Id. at 918. 
131  Id. 
132  Id. 
133  Id. at 919 (“Given these circumstances, the only affidavit defendant could have furnished to 
support his allegations, other than his own, was that of his attorney. . . .  [T]he ‘difficulty or 
impossibility of obtaining such an affidavit is self-apparent.’” (quoting People v. Williams, 264 N.E.2d 
697, 698 (Ill. 1970))). 
134  The defendant filed an affidavit in support of his habeas petition which detailed discussions he 
had with counsel and co-counsel.  People v. Rissley, 795 N.E.2d 174, 195 (Ill. 2003).  The court also 
examined the transcript of the plea proceedings.  See id. at 186–88.  Additionally, the attorney’s co-
counsel and a death penalty expert testified at a hearing in support of counsel’s ineffective assistance.  
Id. at 196–98. 
135  Hall, 841 N.E.2d at 920 (“[D]efendant’s petition establishes a substantial showing that his 
attorney’s advice was objectively unreasonable.”). 
136  Rissley, 795 N.E.2d at 205. 
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attacked the defendant’s credibility, finding it difficult to believe that 
counsel’s deficient performance induced his plea.137  In support of its 
decision, the court raised the fact that the defendant made admissions on the 
record during the plea hearing and stated that defendant’s motivation was 
“leniency from the sentencing jury.”138 
Few reasonable explanations exist for entering a blind guilty plea in a 
death-penalty-eligible case, so it is surprising that the court did not believe 
that counsel’s deficient advice regarding the undesirability of the jury 
hearing the case twice139 affected the defendant’s decision.  Additionally, 
based on the particular facts of the case, going to trial despite a probable 
finding of guilt was preferable to pleading guilty because the plea 
eliminated some of the defendant’s claims, such as a jurisdictional claim 
that co-counsel and the death penalty expert thought had promise on 
appeal.140  By entering a blind plea, the defendant guaranteed that he would 
be found guilty while leaving open the possibility that he would be 
sentenced to death.141 
On the other hand, in Hall, the court concluded with little discussion 
both that the prejudice prong was satisfied and that there was a reasonable 
probability that defendant would have proceeded to trial absent counsel’s 
deficient advice.142  The court held this despite the state’s claim that it 
“strain[ed] belief” to argue that the defendant did not know the child was in 
the car.143  The court did not think that the trial court’s admonishments 
“negate[d] the effect of [the] erroneous advice from defense counsel”;144 
 
137  Id. at 206. 
138  Id.  For a discussion of the requirement that a defendant make admissions on the record when a 
guilty plea is entered, see supra notes 27–28 and accompanying text. 
139  The defendant contended that he was told by his attorney that he would not get the death penalty 
if he waived the jury trial.  Rissley, 795 N.E.2d at 195.  His counsel corroborated these allegations in 
stating that he did not inform the defendant that he was entitled to a bench trial rather than a jury trial.  
Id. at 198.  His attorney testified that he told the defendant that “it would be better that [the jurors] don’t 
hear all this twice, it’s better they hear it once.”  Id. 
140  Defendant’s counsel was aware that the state was seeking the death penalty, but as indicated by 
the term “blind plea,” he had no assurances as to what sentence the defendant would receive during 
sentencing.  Id. at 185 (“[T]he prosecutor advised both defendant and the circuit court of the State’s 
intention to seek the death penalty in the case.”).  A death penalty expert told counsel that “the [blind] 
guilty plea was ill-advised because by pleading guilty defendant had nothing left to bargain with and that 
the plea waived arguments such as jurisdiction.”  Id. at 197. 
141  Although the defendant was sentenced to death, his sentence was later commuted to natural life 
by then-Governor George Ryan.  Id. at 177.  In fact, after the commutation, the defendant entered a 
motion to dismiss his postconviction petition.  Id.  The court denied his motion, resulting in this opinion.  
Id. 
142  People v. Hall, 841 N.E.2d 913, 921 (Ill. 2005). 
143  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  Here, the court described credibility arguments as 
“misplaced” because such judgments are not made at the second stage of postconviction proceedings.  
Id. 
144  Id.; see also id. at 923 (“The admonition ensured defendant was aware of the language of the 
charge, but it did not add to his understanding of the knowledge element of the offense.”). 
105:1707  (2011) Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
 1729
rather, it took the repetitive nature of the erroneous advice into 
consideration.145 
It is difficult to distinguish the facts of Rissley from those of Hall.  
However, one distinguishing factor between the two cases is that at the plea 
hearing in Hall, the defendant entered a guilty plea but did not admit that he 
was guilty of the offense.146  Additionally, the defendant received the 
negotiated sentence of six years.147 
In Rissley and Hall, the proceedings focused primarily on whether the 
defendant could establish a viable innocence claim or defense rather than on 
counsel’s performance or attempts to ensure that proceedings were 
fundamentally fair.148  The defendants received substandard advice from 
counsel and argued that they would have made different decisions had their 
attorneys performed adequately.149  However, in the capital case, such 
allegations were not enough to meet the bar set by the state’s adaptation of 
the prejudice prong.150  Providing defendants with a fundamentally fair 
process was one of the Supreme Court’s underlying goals when it 
developed the Strickland test.151 
Innocence is not explicitly required by Strickland–Hill or the Sixth 
Amendment.  Only allowing a defendant to challenge counsel’s 
performance if he can also assert a claim of innocence is unfair152 and 
highly subjective.  For these reasons, the Illinois standard is 
unconstitutional.153 
 
145  Id. at 923–24. 
146  Id. at 916. 
147  Id. 
148  See id. at 921 (concluding that the defendant’s allegations supported a claim of innocence of 
aggravated kidnapping); People v. Rissley, 795 N.E.2d 174, 205 (Ill. 2003) (discussing the defendant’s 
admission of guilt and lack of a plausible defense in finding that the defendant was not prejudiced by 
counsel’s performance). 
149  See Rissley, 795 N.E.2d at 195; Hall, 841 N.E.2d at 917. 
150  Rissley, 795 N.E.2d at 205. 
151  For a discussion of the Court’s interests in developing the Strickland v. Washington test, see 
supra Part II.A. 
152  See Klein, supra note 125, at 552 (“The requirement that in order for a defendant to obtain relief 
from a plea in which he was not afforded the effective assistance of counsel he must show that he would 
have gone to trial and perhaps have been acquitted, overlooks the many serious ways a defendant suffers 
from inadequate counsel.”). 
153  In Hill, when the Supreme Court adopted the Strickland prejudice requirement it acknowledged 
that under some circumstances, such as when the “alleged error of counsel is a failure to investigate or 
discover potentially exculpatory evidence,” it may be appropriate to consider whether such investigation 
would have changed the outcome of the trial.  Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985).  However, the 
Court declined to determine what was required to satisfy the prejudice prong when counsel was 
ineffective for other conduct, such as providing erroneous advice, beyond whether “there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different.”  Id. at 57, 60 (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970) (internal quotation mark 
omitted).  In the case of erroneous advice, some courts require only that a defendant show that he would 
have proceeded to trial rather than pleaded guilty.  Illinois courts have interpreted the “outcome” at issue 
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B. Indications that Innocence Is Not Required 
Although not addressing the issue directly, the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Kimmelman v. Morrison154 provides some insight into the 
prejudice prong of Strickland.155  The majority stated that the Court had 
“never intimated that the right to counsel is conditioned upon actual 
innocence” because “[t]he constitutional rights of criminal defendants are 
granted to the innocent and the guilty alike.”156 
The Court further explained that the guarantee of effective assistance 
does not belong “solely to the innocent” or apply only when proceedings 
relate to the determination of guilt or innocence.157  On remand, the framing 
of the issue implied that the defendant could establish the prejudice prong if 
she showed that her Fourth Amendment claim had merit and “that if the 
evidence had been excluded, there was a reasonable probability that the 
outcome of the trial would have been different.”158  Justice Powell and 
Justice Rehnquist concurred in the opinion and raised the objection that, if 
the reviewing court determined that the evidence prejudiced the defendant, 
it would render the “verdict[] less fair.”159 
 
to be whether the defendant would have been acquitted at trial, rather than whether the defendant would 
have pleaded guilty or gone to trial in situations where the defendant pleaded on the basis of counsel’s 
erroneous advice.  See Rissley, 795 N.E.2d at 204–05 (upholding the defendant’s blind plea entered 
upon erroneous advice from counsel that the defendant would not receive the death penalty if he pleaded 
guilty; the defendant received the death penalty). 
154  477 U.S. 365 (1986).  In Kimmelman, an attorney failed to make a crucial motion to exclude 
from evidence during the defendant’s bench trial a bed sheet that was obtained during an illegal search.  
Id. at 368–69.  Counsel claimed that he was unaware of the seizure; however, one month before trial, the 
prosecutor gave the defense a copy of a lab report detailing the stains and hairs found on the sheets.  Id. 
at 369.  The evidence was entered at trial and the defendant was subsequently convicted of rape.  Id. at 
370–71.  The defendant filed an unsuccessful direct appeal and an unsuccessful postconviction petition.  
Id. at 371. 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the defendant’s habeas claim.  Id. at 373.  The 
primary issue on review was whether restrictions on the review of Fourth Amendment claims in habeas 
petitions should be extended to Sixth Amendment claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.  Id. at 368. 
155  Although this case relates to ineffective assistance of counsel in the trial context rather than the 
guilty plea context, the similarity between the Strickland test and Strickland–Hill test suggests that the 
Court’s view of whether or not innocence is required to satisfy the prejudice prong would apply in both 
contexts. 
156  Id. at 380. 
157  Id. 
158  TOMKOVICZ, supra note 14, at 163; see also Kimmelman, 477 U.S. at 389 (“The question before 
the federal courts is whether a reasonable probability exists that the trial judge would have had a 
reasonable doubt concerning respondent’s guilt if the sheet and related testimony had been excluded.”). 
159  Kimmelman, 477 U.S. at 396 (Powell & Rehnquist, JJ., concurring).  In some ways, this portion 
of the concurrence illustrates a split in opinion over the function of the Sixth Amendment guarantee to 
effective assistance.  Like the Strickland majority, Justice Powell and Justice Rehnquist seemed to view 
the purpose of Strickland and its progeny as ensuring that verdicts are rendered fairly.  Id. at 396 
(“Indeed, it has long been clear that exclusion of illegally seized but wholly reliable evidence renders 
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Illinois should focus its application of the Strickland–Hill prejudice 
prong on the “fundamental fairness” of the proceedings and discard the 
unconstitutional actual innocence requirement.  This change would center 
on whether a defendant received effective counsel rather than whether he 
would likely succeed at trial.   
One way to create a constitutional standard is to relate the evidentiary 
burden of the prejudice requirement to the type of ineffectiveness at issue.  
In some instances, such as those in which a defendant claims that counsel’s 
failure to investigate was prejudicial, it may be reasonable to consider the 
probable effect of that evidence at trial.  However, when counsel’s 
ineffective performance is manifested through inaccurate statements of the 
law or potential consequences facing a defendant, a determination of 
whether the information induced the defendant’s plea seems more 
appropriate.  This determination is especially appropriate since a defendant 
must be adequately informed in order to make a voluntary and intelligent 
decision to plead guilty.160 
V. RECONSIDERING THE APPLICATION OF STRICKLAND–HILL TO GUILTY 
PLEAS 
From its inception, the Strickland–Hill standard has been difficult to 
administer in the context of guilty pleas.  Commentators,161 the lower 
appellate courts,162 and state courts163 have struggled to define precisely 
what a defendant must establish in order to satisfy the prejudice prong of 
the test.  It is worth considering whether the Strickland–Hill test could be 
improved, or if adopting an entirely new standard designed with the 
 
verdicts less fair and just, because it ‘deflects the truthfinding process and often frees the guilty.’” 
(quoting Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 490 (1976))). 
On the other hand, Justice Marshall thought that the Court’s focus was misplaced in Strickland and 
that grossly incompetent assistance on its own violated the Sixth Amendment because of the procedural 
unfairness that defendants with inept counsel suffer.  See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 707, 
711 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting).  Justice Marshall disagreed with the Strickland majority’s analysis 
and with its adoption and formulation of the prejudice element.  See id.; Klein, supra note 125, at 550 
(“The primary objective of our criminal justice system must be justice, not finality and judicial 
economy.  It does not seem appropriate to tell the defendant who received incorrect information from an 
attorney . . . that he has no recourse because ‘of the fundamental interest in the finality of guilty pleas.’” 
(quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985))).  Klein also notes that twenty years earlier, the Court 
emphasized the rights of the individual over a need for finality, stating that “conventional notions of 
finality . . . cannot be permitted to defeat . . . constitutional rights of personal liberty.”  Id. at 550 n.136 
(quoting Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 424 (1963)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
160  For further discussion of alternative approaches, see infra Part V.B. 
161  See, e.g., TOMKOVICZ, supra note 14, at 160–61 (discussing an interpretation of the Strickland–
Hill prejudice prong that does not require the defendant to establish innocence). 
162  For a discussion of the application of the Strickland–Hill prejudice prong by appellate courts, see 
supra note 93. 
163  See, e.g., supra Part IV.A for a discussion of the application of the Strickland–Hill prejudice 
prong by Illinois courts. 
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realities of the plea process in mind would benefit both defendants and the 
courts.  Section A of this Part will consider some reasons for change, 
section B will propose alternative standards, and section C will discuss 
concerns with changing the Strickland–Hill standard. 
A. System-Legitimacy Concerns 
The public’s perception of procedural justice—whether the criminal 
justice system treats defendants fairly and respectfully regardless of the 
substantive outcome reached—determines the public’s willingness to 
engage in and comply with the system.164  The guilty plea process presents 
competing concerns relating to the legitimacy of the system.  First, finality 
of guilty pleas is essential to maintaining confidence in the integrity of the 
procedure.165  Additionally, finality ensures that the judicial workload is not 
unnecessarily increased and that the “orderly administration of justice” is 
not unduly delayed.166  The destabilization of guilty pleas presents a special 
concern because of the sheer volume of criminal convictions that results 
from pleas.167  With these considerations in mind, it is understandable that 
courts are concerned with protecting convictions obtained through guilty 
pleas against challenges from defendants who simply want “the opportunity 
to strike a harder bargain with the government.”168  The Hill Court explicitly 
discussed these concerns when it adopted the Strickland prejudice prong for 
application in the guilty plea context.169 
However, if the prejudice standard is set at a level at which it is 
difficult for even those defendants with valid claims to meet the evidentiary 
burden, then all guilty pleas, including those that result from prejudicial and 
ineffective counsel, will be insulated from challenge.170  One particular 
system-legitimacy concern in the guilty plea context is how ineffective 
assistance affects disparate groups.  Indigent defendants account for more 
 
164  See generally E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL 
JUSTICE 76–81 (1988) (analyzing studies on procedural justice and discussing how procedural justice 
affects compliance with laws). 
165  See United States v. Timmreck, 441 U.S. 780, 784 (1979). 
166  Id. (quoting United States v. Smith, 440 F.2d 521, 528–29 (7th Cir. 1971) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting)). 
167  See supra Part I.A for a discussion of the prevalence of guilty pleas. 
168  Gargano v. United States, 852 F.2d 886, 891 (7th Cir. 1988). 
169  See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985) (“[R]equiring a showing of ‘prejudice’ from 
defendants who seek to challenge the validity of their guilty pleas on the ground of ineffective assistance 
of counsel will serve the fundamental interest in the finality of guilty pleas . . . .”). 
170  See, e.g., Martin C. Calhoun, Note, How to Thread the Needle: Toward a Checklist-Based 
Standard for Evaluating Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims, 77 GEO. L.J. 413, 414, app. at 1 
(1988) (noting that from the time of the Strickland decision until the time of the Note, (1) the Supreme 
Court rejected all of the ineffectiveness claims that it squarely addressed and (2) that a survey of circuit 
court ineffectiveness cases showed that only 30 of 702 claims, or 4.27%, were successful). 
105:1707  (2011) Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
 1733
than 80% of the individuals who are criminally prosecuted in state courts.171  
Approximately 90% of indigent defendants plead guilty,172 making them 
disproportionately more likely to suffer injustice as a result of the plea 
process.  These defendants are typically represented by public defenders 
who practice under crushing caseloads and scarce resources.173  As a result, 
in many cases defendants plead guilty before having had meaningful 
contact with a public defender.174  Worse still, some public defenders are 
“ill-informed about their clients’ cases and circumstances before advising 
them to take pleas offered by prosecutors at arraignment.”175  By making 
pleas difficult to challenge, the current prejudice standard perpetuates this 
system.  If a change in the applicable standard opened an avenue for 
postconviction relief, the standard of representation at the trial level would 
presumably improve.176  The current standard has been “universally 
criticized as far less demanding than the ethical and professional standards 
governing defense attorneys.”177 
Further, when a procedure is perceived by the public as operating fairly 
and with “procedural regularity,” it functions as a “psychological stabilizer” 
and promotes the acceptance of the process.178  Through the adoption of the 
 
171  See CAROLINE WOLFE HARLOW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS 
SPECIAL REPORT: DEFENSE COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL CASES 1 (2000), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.
gov/content/pub/pdf/dccc.pdf. 
172  See Mary Sue Backus & Paul Marcus, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases, a National 
Crisis, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 1031, 1034 (2006). 
173  See, e.g., Eric H. Holder, U.S. Attorney Gen., Address at the 2009 ABA Convention (Aug. 3, 
2009) (transcript available at http://www.justice.gov/ag/speeches/2009/ag-speech-090803.html).  
Resources for public defender programs lag far behind other justice system programs, constituting only 
about 3% of all criminal justice expenditures in our nation’s largest counties.  In many cases, contract 
attorneys and assigned lawyers receive compensation that does not even cover their overhead.  
Defenders in many jurisdictions carry huge caseloads that make it difficult for them to fulfill their legal 
and ethical responsibilities to their clients.  And we often hear of lawyers who cannot interview their 
clients properly, file appropriate motions, conduct fact investigations, or perform many of the duties an 
attorney ought to perform as a matter of course.  See THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, JUSTICE DENIED: 
AMERICA’S CONTINUING NEGLECT OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL 8 (2009), available at 
http://www.nlada.org/DMS/Documents/1239831988.5/Justice%20Denied_%20Right%20to%20Counsel
%20Report.pdf. 
174  See, e.g., Holder, supra note 173. 
175  See Backus & Marcus, supra note 172, at 1033–34. 
176  An increased number of successful ineffective assistance claims through postconviction and 
habeas proceedings would create a trickle-down effect that would result in higher quality representation.  
When faced with a number of reversals on ineffective-assistance grounds, trial courts would begin to 
demand more of attorneys.  In the same vein, an increased number of reversals may result in systematic 
change like increased budgets for public defenders so they can reduce their individual case loads and 
thoroughly prepare more cases. 
177  See Backus & Marcus, supra note 172, at 1087. 
178  See NEWMAN, supra note 17, at 44 n.45 (“It has not escaped those who have been concerned 
with the institution of procedural regularity that one of its prime contributions is as a psychological 
stabilizer; acceptance of law is substantially furthered to the extent that those subject to its rule observe 
its workings with consistent, scrupulous fairness.” (quoting Sanford H. Kadish, The Advocate and the 
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Federal Sentencing Guidelines and similar provisions by the states, the 
penal system in the United States has moved away from focusing on 
rehabilitation,179 yet it is arguably still a goal of the penal system.  That goal 
is furthered when a criminal defendant feels that she has been dealt with 
fairly by the judicial system.180 
B. Alternative Approaches 
The approaches to altering the Strickland–Hill prejudice prong fall into 
two primary categories: (1) adapting the application of the existing test to 
provide more protection to defendants, or (2) designing a new standard 
aligned with the realities of the plea bargaining process.181 
In the first category, Professor Vivian Berger raised a question as to 
how “Strickland’s outcome-prejudice test would apply to claims of 
inadequate assistance rendered in connection with guilty pleas” shortly 
before the Hill decision.182  Professor Berger suggested that the operative 
language in Strickland indicated that a court must assess the effect of an 
attorney’s deficient performance on the proceeding actually at issue.183  
Under this approach, prejudice is equated with causation: if a defendant can 
show that his attorney’s behavior played a substantial role in inducing the 
plea, he has established prejudice.184  This standard does not attempt to 
predict the outcome of a hypothetical trial, but rather focuses on whether 
 
Expert—Counsel in the Peno-Correctional Process, 45 MINN. L. REV. 803, 836 (1961)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
179  See, e.g., Frank O. Bowman, III, The Failure of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: A Structural 
Analysis, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1315, 1318 (2005) (stating that after the Federal Sentencing Guidelines 
were adopted, “[r]eformers doubted that rehabilitation worked, were skeptical of both the expertise and 
fairness of parole boards, and rebelled against the seeming arbitrariness of standardless judicial 
sentencing discretion”). 
180  See NEWMAN, supra note 17, at 45 n.47 (“Certainly no circumstance could further that purpose 
[rehabilitation] to a great[er] extent tha[t] a firm belief on the part of such offenders in the impartial, 
unhurried, objective, and thorough process of the machinery of the law.” (quoting Fleming v. Tate, 156 
F.2d 848, 850 (D.C. Cir. 1946)) (first alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
181  A third possibility, that the Supreme Court is trending toward relaxing the prejudice prong, has 
also been suggested.  See Whitney Cawley, Note, Raising the Bar: How Rompilla v. Beard Represents 
the Court’s Increasing Efforts to Impose Stricter Standards for Defense Lawyering in Capital Cases, 34 
PEPP. L. REV. 1139, 1176–81 (2007).  Cawley suggests that a recent trio of capital cases where counsel 
was found ineffective during the sentencing phase demonstrates this trend.  See id. (citing Rompilla v. 
Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2005); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 
(2000)).  In each case, counsel was found ineffective because “an overwhelming amount of evidence as 
to the defendant’s background and mental state was not presented to the jury.”  Id. at 1181. 
182  Berger, supra note 60, at 109. 
183  Id. at 110 (highlighting that only the sentencing proceeding was considered by the court in 
Strickland, rather than the likely results of a “hypothetical trial on guilt”). 
184  Id. at 111.  This Comment suggests that the Supreme Court clarifies and restates this standard, 
which presents some line-drawing problems.  However, even if the Court believes it prudent to maintain 
some semblance of the Strickland–Hill formulation, such a test would still be a significant improvement 
over the test currently applied in Illinois. 
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counsel’s bad advice or poor performance induced a defendant’s guilty 
plea.  After applying this standard to Rissley and Hall, it is apparent that 
both defendants, rather than just Hall, would have met this burden.185  
Rissley entered his plea under the impression that he either had to have a 
jury trial, which was disadvantageous due to the nature of the charges he 
was facing, or enter a plea of guilty.186  In addition to this incorrect advice, 
his attorney assured him that pleading guilty would prevent a death 
sentence; however, this advice was false, as there was no agreement from 
the prosecution to take the death penalty off the table.  
This standard, if implemented, would allow more defendants to 
succeed on their ineffective assistance claims.  Adopting this standard 
would not open the floodgates to all defendants who enter a plea and are 
unhappy with the results—defendants would still need to demonstrate that 
counsel provided inadequate assistance in addition to establishing 
prejudice.187 
A similar approach would be to allow defendants to establish a prima 
facie case of ineffective assistance by establishing the first prong of the 
Strickland–Hill test, at which point the prosecution would have the 
responsibility of demonstrating that counsel’s performance did not 
prejudice the defendant.188  As a threshold requirement, the defendant would 
be required to demonstrate that her counsel’s performance fell below an 
objective level of reasonableness.  This requirement would serve as a 
screening function for meritless claims.  This approach is beneficial because 
the prosecution is better situated to rebut the claim of prejudice than a 
defendant. 
C. Objections to Changing the Strickland–Hill Standard 
The Strickland–Hill test is intended to balance competing interests of 
accuracy and stability with a fair process in which counsel engages in an 
adversarial process “as the guilty defendant’s advocate.”189  When the idea 
 
185  See supra Part IV.A for further discussion of Hall and Rissley. 
186  See supra notes 139–41 for further discussion of the circumstances surrounding Rissley’s guilty 
plea. 
187  Professor Berger points out that the prejudice hurdle should be “real” but not “insurmountable.”  
Berger, supra note 60, at 112. 
188  This approach mirrors the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, which determines the 
burdens and nature of proof required in proving a Title VII case.  See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. 
Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).  Under this framework, a plaintiff must allege facts that are sufficient to 
support a legal claim of discrimination.  See id. at 802.  The burden of production then shifts to the 
employer to rebut the prima facie case by “articulat[ing] some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for 
the employee’s rejection.”  Id.  Finally, the employee may prevail only if he can show that the 
employer’s defense is false.  See id. at 804–05. 
189  NEWMAN, supra note 17, at 216 (“In short, the full-blown negotiated plea is not merely an 
appeal for mercy; it is an adversary process and the lawyer serves the function of the guilty defendant’s 
advocate.”). 
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of change is raised, there is naturally fear that it “would multiply the 
number of claims and invite rampant second-guessing of trial attorneys.”190 
This fear of change is overstated.  The plea system generally “rewards 
defendants who make such admissions . . . by allowing them . . . to reap the 
benefits of reduced sentences.”191  The “reward” of a lower sentence for 
accepting a plea incentivizes defendants not to appeal their sentences unless 
the process did not function properly.192  Although specific data are not 
available, it seems that the system does in fact function properly in the large 
majority of cases.  Defendants who wish to backtrack in this process and 
risk trial while knowing that they are relinquishing the deal they already 
received are likely doing so because the system malfunctioned.193  With this 
objection to change put into perspective, system legitimacy and 
fundamental fairness suggest that a new standard for addressing ineffective 
assistance in the guilty plea context should be adopted. 
CONCLUSION 
In our criminal justice system, the vast majority of defendants plead 
guilty.  To be valid, a plea must be knowing and voluntary; that standard, 
according to the Sixth Amendment, requires that a defendant receive 
effective assistance of counsel during the guilty plea process.  The volume 
of cases and shortage of resources, in addition to other incentives to clear 
cases quickly, creates a situation in which ineffective assistance of counsel 
is a significant concern.194  The Supreme Court combated ineffective 
assistance through the two-prong Strickland test.  This test does not 
 
190  Jeffrey Levinson, Note, Don’t Let Sleeping Lawyers Lie: Raising the Standard for Effective 
Assistance of Counsel, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 147, 163 (2001). 
191  Allison Stephens, Note, A Method to the Madness: The Importance of Proving Prejudice in the 
Context of the Guilty Plea, 39 GA. L. REV. 1487, 1517 (2005). 
192  For an illustration of this process, see BOGIRA, supra note 20, at 38. (“The defense lawyer 
sometimes serves as floor salesperson before the 402, softening up the defendant by stressing the 
maximum he might get if he insists on trial . . . .  Next to the sticker price, the wholesale offer is 
attractive.  Not many defendants would plead, of course, if they had nothing to lose by going to trial.”). 
193  See Emily Rubin, Note, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel and Guilty Pleas: Toward a Paradigm 
of Informed Consent, 80 VA. L. REV. 1699, 1718–19 (1994) (“Unlike the trial setting, there is . . . a built-
in disincentive for those with meritless claims of ineffective assistance to bring those claims in court.”). 
194  See id. at 1715 (“The very nature of the plea bargaining system invites inadequate 
representation.  Cases are often dealt with hurriedly, through casual interactions between the prosecutor 
and the defense attorney, who sometimes have longstanding bargaining relationships.  Attention to the 
facts of individual cases may be compromised as the bargaining process becomes more and more 
habitual for defense attorneys and the prosecutors come to expect certain bargaining behavior.  
Moreover, because of the speed with which bargaining is conducted, interaction between defendants and 
defense attorneys will often be very limited.” (footnotes omitted)); see also Berger, supra note 60, at 61 
(“[T]he crushing caseloads of public defenders and the cut-rate fees for appointed counsel . . . promote 
lackluster performance by discouraging careful investigation and making the bargained-for guilty plea 
an attractive option that counsel (perhaps more than clients) find extremely hard to refuse.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
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translate well from the trial setting to the plea setting because it does not 
provide sufficient protection of a defendant’s right to effective counsel.  
The prejudice prong presents a nearly insurmountable burden to defendants, 
with the result that ineffective assistance may be insulated rather than 
remedied. 
Further, as this test is applied in Illinois, defendants are unlikely to 
succeed on legitimate claims of ineffective assistance, even in cases where 
the court agrees that counsel’s performance was deficient, because 
defendants must raise a claim of innocence or a defense that is sufficient to 
persuade a judge that the defendant was likely to succeed at trial.  Not only 
does this standard do a disservice to defendants by tipping the scale too far 
in favor of reversal proofing guilty pleas, but it also fails to reflect the 
realities of what a judge is able to determine from a scant plea-proceeding 
record.  Further, and most importantly, this standard shifts the court’s focus 
from the fundamental fairness of the proceedings to ancillary issues of 
innocence that neither the Strickland–Hill standard nor the Constitution 
require. 
At a minimum, Illinois must realign with the Strickland–Hill prejudice 
standard.  However, the overall approach to ineffective assistance in the 
guilty plea context must be reconsidered and replaced with a standard 
designed to address the realities of the guilty plea process. 
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